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Europe’s British Question: The UK-EU Relationship  
in a Changing Europe and Multipolar World 
Tim Oliver1 
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Abstract 
Britain’s often uneasy relationship with the European Union has become increasingly 
strained leading to speculation that Britain is – sooner or later – headed towards an in-out 
referendum that will result in its withdrawal. Such a development would present both Britain 
and the EU with unprecedented challenges. Britain’s debate about its future in the EU - its 
‘European question’ - creates a ‘British question’ for the EU, the answers to which could 
change the EU’s unity, leadership, prosperity and security with implications for wider 
European politics and academic analysis of European integration. This article sets out the 
links between these two questions. It does so by considering what the future of UK-EU 
relations could mean for the regional politics of Europe in an emerging multipolar order. 
Keywords: Britain, Europe, Europeanisation, Euroscepticism, integration, multipolarity.  
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Introduction 
Britain has rarely played a smooth part in European integration, earning the description of 
‘an awkward partner’.2 Some in the rest of the European Union could be forgiven for thinking 
that in recent years Britain has gone further, becoming a dysfunctional and destructive 
partner. Not a day seems to pass without Britain’s domestic politics causing problems for the 
rest of the EU. The relationship now seems characterised by vetoes, rows, allegations of 
blackmail, of Britain gambling with its future, and where even a British Foreign Secretary can 
declare that Britain is ‘lighting a fire’ under the EU.3 Some of these problems stem from 
tensions within the Conservative Party. Yet the ‘European question’ in British politics is not 
simply about the problems of one political party. Whatever the outcome of the UK’s 2015 
general election, the issue of Britain’s EU membership looks set to remain a topic of often-
fraught political debate.4 All three of the UK’s main parties are committed to holding an in-out 
referendum, albeit under different circumstances with Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
prepared to hold an in-out referendum in the event of any new EU treaty or significant 
transfer of new powers.5 That the Eurosceptic UK Independence Party (UKIP) has emerged 
as a political force in part explains why this has happened. But we should not overlook the 
internal – and in the case of Scotland’s vote on independence, existential – problems the UK 
is passing through which have knock-on effects for the rest of Europe.6 While a British exit 
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(also known as a ‘Brexit’) is not inevitable or as likely as might appear if one focuses on the 
UK’s press coverage of EU matters, the UK’s ongoing difficult relations with the rest of the 
EU mean it looks set to remain an awkward partner. Even if the government elected in 2015 
is not directly committed to holding a referendum, the idea and possibility will continue to 
hang over UK-EU relations. 
So far Britain’s behaviour has provoked only a few direct calls for it to leave the EU.7 This is 
in part because politicians of other member states have tried to avoid involving themselves 
in a topic that could influence the UK’s 2015 general election. However, it is also because 
the idea of any member state either quitting or being forced out of the EU is a taboo. Either 
would be an unprecedented and potentially traumatic development. Despite this there is 
limited analysis of the potential implications for the EU of a withdrawal by Britain or any other 
member state. This compares with the plethora of books, reports, articles and speeches on 
what a Brexit could mean for the UK.8 The growing possibility of a British exit, and the 
possibility of a Greek exit from the Eurozone (known as a ‘Grexit’), has led to some 
publications, but these remain small in number. 9  The academic, especially theoretical 
literature is little better. The vast literature on Europeanisation includes only a few pieces 
that explore ideas and theories of European disintegration.10 The field remains dominated by 
top-down theories of Europeanisation that assume continued integration. Much less 
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research addresses how domestic politics – not least a decision by a member state to 
withdraw – could affect EU-level politics and the wider geopolitics of Europe.11 
This lack of debate or analysis does not mean a Brexit or some form of exclusion is not 
contemplated elsewhere in the EU.12 But as can be seen in any review of how other EU 
member states view the UK-EU relationship, the question of what to do about Britain has to 
be seen in the wider context of an EU facing significant and potentially existential challenges 
ranging from the survival of the Eurozone through to the security of Eastern Europe vis-a-vis 
an increasingly assertive Russia. The ‘British Question’ can appear something of a 
distraction, one which the rest of the EU might see little incentive to agonise over. This is 
especially so given Britain is not a member of the Eurozone, and seems determined to 
isolate itself. 
Understandable though such feelings are, the ‘British question’ is connected to broader 
questions about the future direction of European integration and European regional politics. 
Even if Britain is a declining power within the EU, thanks to a growing population it is to 
some extent a growing power in a wider European sense. A British withdrawal from the EU 
would also change the EU and European politics adding to already transformative changes 
unleashed by the Eurozone’s struggles. Much to the disappointment of British Eurosceptics, 
the EU will not disappear from British politics should it withdraw. In much the same way 
‘British-sceptics’ in the EU will be disappointed to find that what happens in British politics 
will continue to matter more than they might like for the rest of Europe and the EU.  
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To explore how Britain’s domestic debate could potentially change the path of European 
integration the article examines five aspects of UK-EU relations. First, it briefly outlines some 
ideas and theories of European disintegration that we will return to while discussing the 
potential impact of a Brexit. The article then examines what Britain’s ‘European Question’ is 
and how it shapes Britain’s behaviour in Europe. The paper then moves onto the ‘British 
question’ facing the rest of the EU by looking at how the EU could be changed by Britain’s 
behaviour. This opens up discussion of what the ramifications for the EU and Europe could 
be from a Brexit. Finally, the paper turns to the wider question of the British and European 
security relationship in an emerging multi-polar world. In analysing these issues the article 
draws not only on the aforementioned academic literature on Europeanisation but also the 
small number of reports on what a Brexit could mean for the EU. A great deal of the latter is 
speculative, this topic remaining an underexplored area even in the think tank community. 
One aim of the article therefore is to provide a synthesis of the literature that allows us to 
map out some of the potential scenarios for how UK-EU relations may develop. 
Ideas of European Disintegration 
There have been few academic attempts to analyse the way in which the EU could reverse 
direction, either disintegrating or fragmenting. In one of the few pieces of work on this topic, 
Douglas Webber reviewed several theories of European integration, assessing to what 
extent the variables that each identifies as driving forward European integration are still 
present, have waned or disappeared in recent year. 13  Webber defines European 
disintegration as meaning: ‘a decline in: (1) the range of common or joint policies adopted 
and implemented in the EU; (2) the number of EU member states; and/or (3) the formal (i.e. 
treaty-rooted) and actual capacity of EU organs to make and implement decisions if 
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necessary against the will of individual members.’ 14  Using this he identifies different 
variables that may lead to European disintegration. A realist explanation for a breakdown in 
European integration would point to the withdrawal of US military forces, bringing to an end 
the security guarantee that has sheltered European integration. Classic 
intergovernmentalism, based on the idea that integration is pushed forward by the 
preference of the main powers, would break down if the domestic politics of these powers – 
notably Germany and France, but also to some extent the UK – failed to align on key issues. 
As Weber makes clear, ‘Intergovernmentalism implies that if a fundamental breakdown 
should occur in Franco-German relations, this would surely lead to European disintegration.’ 
Similarly, the approach of France, Germany – and potentially the USA and UK – is key to the 
approach of international relations institutionalism which explains the EU’s durability on the 
EU’s institutions achieving a high level of durability and bringing about common interests 
between the member states. According to theories of historic institutionalism, the EU’s 
survival is guaranteed by its longevity and the growing central role it plays in both the politics 
of Europe and of the member states. It would take a significant crisis to change this. Neo-
functionalism, transactionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism theories work on the idea 
the EU has already reached a constitutional and political durability thanks to growing 
economic interdependence. Disintegration could only follow from a decline in this 
interdependence. Finally, according to theories of comparative federalism the EU is 
becoming – or has already become – a federal state. Any disintegration would emerge from 
a further transfer of powers to the EU level provoking a backlash at the national level which 
exposed the weaknesses of this federal level political identity and structure.  
Webber identifies two factors that need to be kept in mind when considering the above 
theories. First, many theories fail to take into account the role of domestic politics, especially 
growing Euroscepticism in the member states. Secondly, they overlook the powerful, 
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potentially hegemonic role of Germany as the state central to underpinning integration. The 
EU and European integration has yet to face a crisis made in Germany. Germany’s central 
position is also raised in the work of Hans Vollaard.15 His work argues that the costs of 
exiting the EU for some states are too high. This is especially so for those within the Euro or 
who have a sense of interdependence that is much stronger than for others, this particularly 
applying to member states who are physically surrounded by other EU member states as 
opposed to located on its periphery. Some states also have unique options open to them, for 
example links with other states around the world, which mean they can balance or seek to 
replace their relationship with the EU.  
The Europe Question in British Politics 
When in January 2013 David Cameron committed his Conservative party to holding an in-
out referendum, he argued, ‘It is time to settle this European question in British politics’.16 
The question can appear to be a simple in-out one, and potentially one that only exercises 
the Conservative party. However, closer examination of the issue throws doubts on whether 
the complexities of the UK-EU relationship can be reduced to a simple in-out choice or just a 
Conservative party obsession. 17  Britain has long been home to a range of ambivalent 
feelings about relations with the rest of Europe, and in particular the EU, that connect not 
only to UK-EU relations, but to changes in UK politics and ideas of Britain’s place in Europe 
and the world. 
First, the European question is about identity and national interpretations of history. Britain is 
not the only EU member to be home to ambivalent feelings about European integration. 
However, Britain’s experiences seem to have created particularly strong feelings. This is in 
part a result of Britain’s late membership of the EU, difficulties being admitted, a feeling that 
joining the EU was an abdication of a wider global role and giving up on a separation that 
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has, to some extent, spared Britain some of the instability experienced elsewhere in Europe, 
a frustration at the failure of Britain’s efforts at the alternative European Free Trade Area, 
difficult economic changes as UK trade moved towards Europe and away from former 
imperial markets, and a membership that began in the economic crises of the 1970s and so 
missed the economic growth seen in the earlier phases of European integration. Underlying 
all this has been a feeling the relationship is a transactional one, a marriage of convenience 
with membership as a means to an end. That end has never been the EU’s ideal of ‘ever 
closer union’, more of enhancing British wealth and power in the world. Seeing membership 
of the EU as a means to an end creates tensions because the EU has come to represent 
’Europe’ which has for a long time served as the ‘other’ against which British - and notably, 
but by no means exclusively, English – identity is cast.18 This is so strong the British - fed 
especially by a famously Eurosceptic media - can often overlook their European identity. 
Britain has not faced any catastrophic defeat or revolution that has triggered a critical-
juncture in its history where it has had to reevaluate its position and identity vis-a-vis the rest 
of Europe. Instead, the Eurozone crisis combined with the growing appeal of emerging 
markets have added to a sense that the EU is the past. In a telling choice of words, former 
Conservative MP turned UKIP MP Douglas Carswell once told the House of Commons that 
‘in joining Europe, we shackled ourselves to a corpse.’19 
If there is one arena where differences over UK-EU relations have played out more vividly 
than in any other it is the UK’s party politics. Cameron’s January 2013 speech was a 
reflection of long-running tensions over the EU within his Conservative Party, tensions which 
in part brought down Mrs. Thatcher, tore-apart the government of John Major and plagued 
leaders of the party in opposition from 1997-2010.20 The outcome is a party that has grown 
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increasingly Eurosceptic. However, Conservative divisions can distract attention from 
tensions within other parties. The Labour party is the only major party to have split over the 
issue of Europe, the Social Democrat Party splitting from Labour in 1981 over a range of 
differences, in particular the party’s then policy of opposition to Britain’s participation in 
European integration. Tensions could reemerge, with Labour leader Ed Miliband under 
pressure to take a more Eurosceptic line to stop traditional supporters moving towards 
Eurosceptic parties and to reject what some on the left of the Labour party see as the overtly 
neo-liberal agenda of the EU.21 Even the Liberal Democrats, a party with a commitment to 
the EU in its DNA, has committed itself to an in-out referendum in order to manage internal 
party unease over Europe.22 The rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which has 
emerged as a fourth party of UK politics, has hit all three parties, in particular the 
Conservatives. UKIP’s emergence is not all thanks to the issue of Europe. It has captured 
public disillusionment with the three main parties, unease about Britain’s political economy 
and fears about immigration. Its power and potential might be overplayed, but it 
encapsulates how the issue of Europe is playing a part in the wider decline of two party 
politics and the emergence of a more plural UK party system. The Northern Ireland 
Democratic Unionist Party, whose leader has spoken of the possibility of a coalition with the 
Conservative party, supports an in-out referendum.23 Even Nicola Sturgeon, leader of the 
pro-European Scottish National Party, said in October 2014 that an in-out referendum on EU 
membership in 2017, ‘now seems inevitable – almost regardless of who wins the general 
election next May’. 24  She potentially sees in it the chance to trigger another referendum on 
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Scottish independence.25 This all means that whatever the outcome of the 2015 General 
Election, the issue of Europe looks likely to remain a lively and divisive one within the UK’s 
party politics with the potential for a referendum likely to hang over even a government that 
excludes the Conservative party.26 
Look beyond party politics, or the result of elections, and the issue of Europe is to be found 
embedded in the UK’s constitutional and economic tensions. Scotland’s independence 
referendum was the most obvious sign the United Kingdom is going through a constitutional 
and identity crisis that could make or break it. The Scottish question itself far from settled, 
especially with regard to potential developments in UK-EU relations.27 Various cities, regions 
and centres of power across the UK are manoeuvring for change.28 The situation in Northern 
Ireland, while much improved, should also not be taken for granted; especially if the UK 
were to vote to leave the EU.29 The issue of sovereignty is often raised when discussing the 
UK’s EU membership. Yet debates about sovereignty cannot be narrowed to the UK-EU 
relationship given that different ideas of sovereignty exist within the UK.30 Arguments over 
sovereignty also drive calls for the UK to abandon the European Convention on Human 
Rights - often mistakenly thought to be a part of the EU. Such calls often ignore the 
marginalisation this would bring to the UK and the British origins of the document. The most 
important political, economic and constitutional questions facing the UK revolve around the 
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power of London.31 The capital city is a place apart from England and the rest of the UK. It is 
a largely pro-European, international mega-city, where a third of the population was born 
outside the UK and white-Britons make up only 45% of the population.32 When it comes to 
participation in the EU or globalisation, London appears to be ahead in a race other parts of 
the UK are either falling behind in or weary of the consequences (especially over 
immigration) of taking part in.33 This creates tensions within the UK and in UK-EU relations 
when London dominates the UK’s economic, political and EU policies. Such is London’s 
growing difference from the rest of the UK that campaigning on an anti-London ticket pays 
dividends whether you are Scottish nationalists or UKIP seeking support elsewhere in 
England. 
So how likely is it that if faced with an in-out choice the British people would opt for getting 
out of the EU? We should be careful not to assume such a breakdown in relations is 
inevitable. The rocky relationship of UK-EU relations has seen many low-points, including an 
in-out referendum in 1975. It remains to be seen whether an in-out referendum will even 
happen. Any Labour or Liberal Democrat commitment would only be triggered if the EU 
undertook a new treaty of transfer of power. The conservatives would need to form a 
majority government in order to be sure a referendum on their terms takes place, or secure a 
commitment to this as part of a new coalition agreement. Polling also shows that while the 
British electorate are not overly enthusiastic about the EU, their views are more complex and 
less harsh than often assumed.34 Polling shows support for withdrawal has not yet matched 
the heights it did in the early 1980s when one polling organisation registered 71% support 
for withdrawal.35 When pushed on the issue, polling shows a large proportion of the public 
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opt for the status-quo of remaining within the EU with support increasing if this is preceded 
by some renegotiated relationship. 36  Nevertheless, the rise in support for UKIP does 
represent an unease about the EU that cannot be dismissed. Some polling might have 
shown the British people are likely to vote to stay in, but there have been numerous polls 
indicating support for withdrawal. Events in Scotland serve as a reminder that even though 
the vast majority of polling points one way - in the case of Scotland the direction was 
towards remaining a part of the UK - the overall vote may be uncertain and closer than most 
are comfortable with. 
The British Question in European Politics 
Britain’s debates about its European question often focus on the negatives of Britain’s EU 
membership. The debate therefore overlooks that Britain has exercised a degree of power 
and influence in the EU that has passed unappreciated in UK political debate. Britain’s 
influence has not passed unnoticed elsewhere in the EU. Europe’s ‘British Question’ is not 
only about whether the UK will stay or leave, but how to manage relations with a state that 
has played a large role in European integration and wider European politics. Not only has 
the UK successfully secured a large number of exemptions from EU policies - the most 
obvious being from the Euro, Schengen, some Justice and Home Affairs policies, and a 
rebate on its contributions to the EU’s budget. Britain has also successfully pushed agendas 
such as enlargement of the EU, cooperation on foreign, security and defence matters, and 
its ‘Anglo-Saxon’ economic influence over the political economy of the EU was one of the 
reasons many feel was to blame for the 2005 French referendum rejection of the EU’s 
Constitution.37  Indeed, Britain can be viewed as having benefitted most of all from EU 
membership, even in areas that give rise to much debate in the UK such as intra-EU 
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immigration.38 Nevertheless, the UK’s position in the EU can appear to be in a position of 
decline and marginalisation. This is not without some justification given the UK’s domestic 
political debate makes for an often strained UK-EU relationship. In an EU of 28 members, 
the UK can appear just one member, and one increasingly sidelined by the attention that is 
focused on the leadership of Germany. British governments have long struggled in their 
relations with other EU states, but relations today seem to have reached new lows.39  
As several of the theories of European disintegration touched on earlier make clear, a large 
member state such as the UK plays a central in European integration with its actions likely to 
influence the response of other member states. Britain’s place in Europe looks set to grow, 
potentially counterbalancing its marginalisation within the EU. On current projections 
Britain’s population will overtake that of Germany in the 2040s. Germany has already begun 
to experience a decline in its population, something that has not passed unnoticed within 
Germany itself.40  If the projections hold then by the 2040 the UK could have a larger 
population than any other EU member state. It would be behind only Russia and Turkey in a 
wider European context. Even the loss of 5.5 million Scots – should they hold another 
referendum at some point and decide to withdraw – would be made up by 10-15 years of 
population growth in the rest of the UK. By 2035 the population of England alone could be 
62.1 million, and expected to grow even further by 2060.41  
Projected populations 2010 and 206042 
2010 2060 
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Germany – 81.7 million UK – 78.9 million 
France – 64.7 million France – 73.7 million 
UK – 62 million Germany – 66.4 million 
Italy – 60.3 million Italy – 64.9 million 
Spain – 45.9 million Spain – 52.2 million 
EU – 501 million EU – 516.9 million 
 
Accurate population projections are notoriously difficult. A large population is also no 
guarantor of power. Nor does it mean the UK’s economy will become the largest or most 
important in Europe. However, the economies of Britain, France and Germany could grow 
similar in size cancelling out some of Germany’s economic leadership. Germany could suffer 
problems thanks not only to population decline but also from problems in the Eurozone. It 
could be that Berlin’s efforts to save the Eurozone have not only limited the EU's economic 
potential, but have overstretched Germany leaving it destined to become a drag rather than 
the engine of European growth. Here it is worth recalling Webber’s warning that European 
integration has yet to face a crisis made in Germany.  
In 2050 Britain could also still wield a more powerful military force than any other EU 
member state. Britain’s armed forces are of course much reduced compared to what they 
once were. However, the capabilities of the British military remain considerable.43 Britain will 
almost certainly remain a leading power in NATO, committed to the regional security of 
Europe (even if, like the USA, it has reduced its Cold War military commitments in places 
such as Germany). Britain has committed itself to a number of bilateral defence 
arrangements with other EU states such as France and the Netherlands. Despite the huge 
cost, the UK still looks set, in cooperation with the USA, to replace its Trident nuclear 
weapons system with an upgraded system that will be operational in the middle of the 
                                                 
43
 Andrew Dorman, “The capabilities of Britain’s armed forces may not be diminishing as starkly as the numbers 
might suggest,” LSE British Politics and Policy Blog (31 January 2014), available: 
<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/is-there-a-need-to-panic-british-defence-expenditure-today/> (accessed 
11 November 2014). 
15 
century. Britain will also not operate alone. If there is something ‘special’ about the UK-US 
relationship then it is cooperation on intelligence, nuclear weapons and special forces. 
Despite significant strains in the relationship, cooperation in these areas remains very close. 
These capabilities and relationships also mean the UK has, or at least feels it has compared 
to many other EU member states, more options available to it when examining its future 
relations with the EU and the rest of the world.  
Of course, all of this could change. Germany’s population decline could be halted and 
reversed, its reputation for economic competitiveness and efficiency maintained. Britain’s 
own economic power could falter thanks to an over-reliance on financial services and an 
over-heated South East of England and London. Further and deeper cuts to the British 
military may end what is left of UK military capabilities with a global reach, raising doubts in 
the USA or elsewhere about the viability of continued close links. Britain itself – always 
destined to be located outside the geographical centre of Europe – could be an unsure 
power thanks to ongoing internal problems that define its current political debates, especially 
the aforementioned ones over its unity, identity and place in Europe. Current political and 
racial tensions surrounding immigration could grow given that Britain’s population is 
expected to increase in no small part thanks to immigration and high birth-rates amongst 
immigrant communities. If so then Europe could be faced with a rising power, located on the 
edge of Europe, that is one that could not only break up, but be home to a political debate 
that is inward looking and unsure of itself. 
What seems clear is that as the 2020s approach, Germany’s population decline and Britain’s 
growth will start to register as a political and strategic issue. If this is so then, according to 
theories such as classic intergovernmentalism, for the EU and the UK this means relations 
between the two should matter more. It remains to be seen whether the UK and the rest of 
the EU will maintain the political links for making the most of this relationship. It is also 
unclear whether the EU will be able to respond in a united form. In part this is because one 
of the most frustrating aspects of UK-EU relations is how contradictory, frustrating and 
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confusing they can be. Even when relations are difficult, both sides can often agree over 
some key parts of an issue. The recent appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker as the new 
President of the European Commission saw the UK largely alone in opposing him. Yet 
Britain’s concerns about Juncker, if not its confrontational approach, were not without their 
merit and sympathy elsewhere in the EU.44  
Incidents such as Juncker’s appointment underline how political relations, whether personal 
or inter-party, have rarely been harmonious. David Cameron’s own decision to withdraw his 
Conservative party from the European Peoples Party, and thus detach the Conservatives 
from routine links with most of Europe’s centre-right parties, has left UK-EU party political 
relations - at least at the level of governing parties - resting largely with the Labour Party. 
Britain’s weakness at connecting with other states in the EU becomes clear in any review of 
how others see the UK, with even traditionally close allies such as Sweden or the 
Netherlands growing distant. 45  Admittedly if Britain remains in the EU and population 
projections turn out to be accurate, then in the 2040s British MEPs will begin to outnumber 
their German colleagues in the European Parliament meaning they could become the hub of 
many political party groupings. But this might not make up for the long-running low 
recruitment rates of Britons to EU institutions.46  As discussed earlier, many theories of 
European integration – for example, functionalism, transactionalism or liberal 
intergovernmentalist – rest on growing economic interdependence binding EU member 
states together. As we turn to below, any economic interdependence could potentially make 
up for strains in the UK-EU political relationship, but there are limits to how far this could 
bind the two together.  
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Brexit Stage Right?  
Europe’s ‘British question’ is not then simply about the UK leaving the EU. It is about the 
economic and political place of the UK in a changing EU and how to manage relations with a 
large but difficult European state whether as a member of the EU or not. Should a Brexit 
occur then the initial problem for the EU would be the unprecedented experience of 
negotiating a withdrawal.47 Difficult and potentially interminable Brexit negotiations would not 
only take place with the UK. Negotiations would also have to take place within the EU to fill 
the gap left by Britain. These would revolve around the never-easy tasks of negotiating 
changes to national voting rights, allocation of MEPs and staff, and budgets. When 
combined with possible changes to the Eurozone, a Brexit could add to shifts to the EU’s 
balance of power and changes to the EU’s policies and outlook. This could help push the EU 
towards one of the three outcomes outlined by Tom Wright in his analysis of how the EU 
might move forward in dealing with the Eurozone crisis: increased unity; muddling through; 
or disintegration.48 Which one the EU ends up following will largely reflect developments in 
the Eurozone. Nevertheless, the UK’s behaviour could play an influential part because its 
withdrawal could change the EU’s internal balance of power with implications for wider 
European politics. 
Increased unity within the EU could be brought about by losing a notoriously awkward 
member state, allowing the EU to move more easily towards ‘ever closer union’. While 
countries such as France and Germany have not allowed UK objections to fundamentally 
delay European integration, the UK has stood as an alternative to the direction and ideas of 
European integration. As a result, British opt-outs, such as over the Euro, have placed the 
UK in an outer-tier. A British withdrawal would leave some members of the EU continuing to 
hold some opt-outs, for example Denmark’s non-membership of the Eurozone. However, 
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these would be smaller, and so the EU and Eurozone would more neatly align. There could 
then be no repeat of events in December 2011 when David Cameron’s lone veto of a new 
treaty for the Eurozone led the rest of the EU to bypass the UK and establish arrangements 
for the Eurozone amongst themselves and therefore separate from the EU’s treaties.  
Alternatively, the EU could continue to muddle through, with Britain’s absence having little to 
no effect. The UK’s absence from the Eurozone has not meant leadership or unity of it has 
been easy with deep disagreements over austerity policies and the degree of supranational 
oversight of member states. Any muddling through following a UK exit would also be the 
likely result of the remaining EU coming to terms with shifts and changes to the distribution 
of power within it. Germany’s dominant position could be extended, reinforcing at an EU 
level Germany’s preference for geoeconomic thinking over the geopolitical. 49  The EU’s 
centre of gravity could also shift eastwards, presenting difficulties to states such as France 
that worry about an EU that no longer focuses on Western Europe and in particular the 
Franco-German axis.  
The possibility of EU disintegration as a result of the Eurozone’s problems remains a 
possibility. Whether a British exit by itself could trigger such a collapse would depend on 
whatever centrifugal pressures it could unleash. If a Brexit pressured Germany to weaken its 
commitment to either the EU or Eurozone, then as argued earlier by Webber, European 
integration could face its biggest test to date.50 Britain might not even need to go so far as to 
withdraw to pose such a challenge. Demands by some in the UK for a renegotiated 
relationship within the EU have led to warnings from elsewhere in the EU that an ‘a la carte 
Europe’ is unacceptable as it would lead other states - and in particular political groups on 
the far right and left - to make their own demands, in turn fragmenting the EU. 
                                                 
49
 Han Kundanani, ‘Germany as a Geo-Economic Power’, Washington Quarterly, Vol 34, No. 3, (2011), pages 
31-45.  
50
 See Douglas Webber, “How likely is it that the European Union will disintegrate? A critical analysis of 
competing theoretical perspectives,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 20 No. 2, (June 2014), 
pages 341-365.  
19 
The British question also has implications for wider European unity and cooperation. The 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and/or the European Economic Area (EEA) could be 
transformed by changes to UK-EU relations. Further afield, losing a large, western, Christian 
country would make it highly unlikely that some of the remaining states, especially France, 
will agree to a large eastern European, Muslim country such as Turkey being allowed to join. 
But as with Norway and Switzerland, a British exit, or renegotiated relationship within the 
EU, could open up new models for relations that could then be extended to other states. 
However, this depends on the willingness of these states to give up their own individual 
relationships with the EU, and the willingness of Britain or the EU to share any special 
arrangements.  
If there is one issue that fuels the UK’s debate about membership of the EU, it is economics. 
The same applies to the EU, and especially countries such as Germany who have close 
relations with the UK in trade and shared approaches to political economy. Given the 
important part of economic interdependence to many theories of European integration, it is 
in this area that we may find some pointers to how the EU and the UK-EU relationship may 
develop should the UK decide to withdraw. The UK’s economic place in the EU is 
substantial. Britain constitutes 14.8% of the EU’s economic area, with 12.5% of its 
population.51 British exports are 19.4% of the EU’s total exports (excluding intra-EU trade).52 
Within the EU Britain runs a trade deficit with the rest in goods and services of around £28 
billion a year (2012 figures).53 Neither the UK nor the EU would have an interest in allowing 
a situation in which their economic links are damaged. Nevertheless, the various proposals 
put forward for a new UK-EU economic relationship focus almost entirely on what might be 
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best for Britain. Yet the final agreed arrangement will also be one shaped by what is best for 
the EU and Europe. Few if any member states will see anything to be gained from agreeing 
to a deal whereby the UK can undercut the EU by having access to the EU’s Single Market 
without shouldering any of the costs of membership. The City of London, already something 
of a target for some within the EU, could become an even clearer target for hostile acts 
should the UK withdraw. In the longer-term a Brexit could make the EU less inclined towards 
liberal, free-market economics, a concern often raised by supporters in the EU and 
elsewhere of Britain’s continued membership.54 Britain has been a long-standing supporter 
of the EU’s Single Market and has repeatedly pushed for it to be more open and 
deregulated.55 This has led to uneasy talk elsewhere in the EU of Europe being subject to an 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ agenda, or even the ‘Britishisation’ of the EU.56 However, Britain’s role in the 
EU’s economic thinking is already limited by its exclusion from the Eurozone. Without the UK 
the Eurozone and EU could more neatly align, leaving the members of the Eurozone as the 
undisputed heart of the EU both politically and economically. It is also questionable to what 
extent countries such as Germany or even France would allow the EU, or the Eurozone, to 
become more inward looking and protectionist. Even the European Commission, often 
lambasted by British Eurosceptics as a bastion of state-socialism, also often finds itself 
accused of pursuing harsh neoliberal trade agendas.57 Reforms to the Eurozone might have 
struggled to overcome its problems, but the intention has been to ensure the Eurozone is 
more open and competitive.58 The UK is also not alone in seeing the potential and feeling 
the draw of emerging markets, something some British politicians accuse the EU of holding 
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Britain back from. Germany’s interests in markets such as China and Brazil dwarf those of 
the UK, with many other EU members also pursuing links. Pressure from the USA or China 
and international trade negotiations, will not leave the EU many options but to continue 
embracing an outward looking economic agenda.  
 
Possible economic implications of a Brexit could be seen first with the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a development Britain has been at the forefront of efforts 
to create.59 While a TTIP without the UK would not be impossible – indeed, the USA and EU 
have warned this could happen – Britain’s large economic and political relations with the 
USA and rest of the EU mean it would be more difficult and a lesser deal if secured, and 
potentially a more difficult sell to the US Congress.60 Given the aim of TTIP is to expand to 
include other states such as Canada, a UK outside the EU could secure some form of 
partnership. However, what this partnership with other countries might entail is not yet clear. 
Nor is it clear whether the EU would allow the UK anything less than a backseat in TTIP. For 
the EU the partnership would be a bilateral one between Washington and Brussels. 
 
Europe and Britain’s Global Security Questions 
Even if Britain - in or outside the EU - is a rising power in Europe, the place of Britain, the EU 
and wider Europe will continue to face decline in a wider global sense. Given Britain has 
played a prominent role in European approaches to matters of international security, what 
might then the changing UK-EU relationship mean for how the UK and EU face the political 
and security challenges of an emerging multipolar world?  
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Despite its relative decline in power, Britain remains a European power with global 
aspirations and capabilities that can deliver on this to a certain extent. This is especially so 
when the UK is compared to other EU member states. Along with France, it is the only other 
EU state with a sizeable military that is both experienced and able to operate independently 
- even if in a limited sense - beyond Europe. Britain’s soft power, along with other aspects of 
its power such as in intelligence, diplomacy and humanitarian aid, remain considerable. 
Britain’s international aspirations has been one of the drivers behind efforts to develop the 
EU’s own foreign, security and defence policies and capabilities. 61  This might be little 
appreciated in the UK itself. But one only has to look to the efforts successive UK 
governments have made towards trying to develop European cooperation on international 
matters to see how Britain has sought to lead the EU on international matters in order to 
secure its sought for end of Britain as an international player. This has not focused 
exclusively on EU cooperation. NATO, bilateral or multilateral cooperation have also been 
pursued. Defence and security cooperation with France in particular has been pursued in no 
small part as a result of frustrations by both at the inability of EU cooperation to deliver 
progress with other European partners, particularly Germany. 
British disengagement from the EU could therefore further complicate European defence 
and security cooperation. It may leave France with few options by which to pursue closer 
links with other EU partners, particularly the Weimar Group involving it, Germany and 
Poland. Britain might have been central to EU efforts in these areas, but it has also been a 
big obstacle as a result of domestic unease at cooperation on defence matters at the EU 
level. Britain’s absence could therefore offer the remaining member states of the EU 
opportunities to develop new ideas on defence and security matters. However, as with 
previous efforts at defence cooperation, a lot would depend on Germany’s response.62 A 
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similar problematic outlook could then face NATO, leaving doubts about the future of 
transatlantic relations. Britain would no doubt remain committed to NATO, facilitating a 
means though which high-level international security issues can be discussed in addition to 
any bilateral discussions. But NATO itself continues to face an uncertain future, with British-
EU relations having the potential to further complicate efforts at maintaining or increasing 
European defence cooperation. 
The future of Europe’s place in the world, and how UK-EU relations might shape this and the 
future of NATO, would depend significantly on the positions taken by the USA. The US ‘pivot 
to Asia’ and away from Europe is not a new development, the USA pivoting from Europe in 
the early 1990s when it withdrew large numbers of its European based forces following the 
end of the Cold War. This US disengagement could be reversed should Russian behaviour 
towards states in Eastern Europe become more belligerent. But any such reengagement is 
unlikely to equal that of the Cold War. While talk of US decline can be overblown, the US is 
not in the position to commit to European security in the way it did in the past. Indeed, the 
disappearance from Europe of the American security guarantee – one of particular interest 
to realist interpretations of European integration – is a test the EU and Europe has yet to 
face.63 
Britain’s behaviour - particularly a Brexit - could therefore add to strains in the transatlantic 
relationship which impacts on the US security guarantee. On the one hand any desire by 
Britain to continue working with the USA would require it to engage in affairs beyond Europe. 
While it will retain an ability to do so to some extent, this would face significant difficulties if 
the security of Europe became a more pressing matter. In such a context it is unlikely the 
USA would welcome British support of US efforts internationally instead of British 
engagement in European security matters. The USA could face a series of European 
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problems from a UK exit from, or marginalisation in, the EU. Not only could a British exit 
reduce the UK’s international standing, and thus its utility to the USA. An EU that became 
more inward looking - economically and strategically - as a result of a British exit would 
damage US hopes of European cooperation and engagement in international matters, and 
increased cooperation on defence, that reduce Europe’s security dependence on the USA. 
This does not mean the USA would then give up on the EU or the UK. The sheer economic 
size of the EU - a collective GDP of $18.5 trillion compared to Britain’s $2.5 trillion - means 
close transatlantic relations will be crucial. Nor, despite talk of Britain as the US ‘Trojan 
Horse’ in the EU, will there be any shortage of applicants to fill the UK’s place. The USA has 
long had close relations with a large number of EU states, even if it has sometimes abused 
those relationships or taken them for granted.64 
One reason the USA is likely to maintain an interest in Europe is due to a concern that the 
continent could again become a divided and contested space in international relations. The 
USA is not alone amongst allies of both the UK and rest of the EU at expressing concerns at 
where UK-EU relations may take the wider geopolitics of Europe.65  Countries such as 
Canada, Singapore, Japan, Australia and New Zealand have, like the USA, used their links 
with the UK to influence the EU and maintain an outward looking EU agenda that is friendly 
and accommodating to these states and wider Western interests. But as with the USA, their 
relations with the EU go beyond the UK, with many also having close relations with other EU 
states. For these states the possibility of the EU fragmenting and/or being weakened would 
add to the pressures already facing the West from emerging powers. A Brexit could help 
create a multipolar Europe in a multipolar world.66 A Brexit or break-down in UK-EU relations 
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could see the EU surrounded by the poles of Britain, Russia and Turkey. The outcome, 
should the EU remain weak or carry on muddling through, could make more likely a 
scenario, as outlined by Jan Techau, of a Europe that, “is not a pillar of world affairs but a 
territory that risks being pulled asunder between the United States and Asia”.67 
Conclusion  
The EU faces a long list of challenges, not least of which are the Eurozone’s continuing 
fragility and security fears surrounding the intentions of Russia towards Eastern Europe. The 
‘British Question’ can therefore appear an unwanted distraction. If Britain is going to be half-
hearted and awkward in its relationship with the EU then why should the rest of the EU show 
anything other than half-hearted interest in Britain? Similar feelings can be found amongst 
those in the UK who feel Britain would be better off if it withdrew from the predominant 
political and economic organisation of the continent it is forever bound to. Neither is a 
sustainable approach or likely to make the most of a relationship in which the EU will remain 
the most important relationship for the UK and an integral part of many of the domestic 
debates shaping Britain.  
The various theories of European integration show that the UK’s behavior – especially a 
Brexit – could be an important independent variable that shapes how the EU develops, in 
particular whether the EU disintegrates. A realist account points to the strained security 
situation in Europe, and Britain’s unwillingness or inability to change this, as a key pressure 
on European integration. Cooperation between large member states, the key component of 
classic intergovernmentalism, could continue despite a Brexit if the Franco-German axis was 
sustained. The continued vitality of the Franco-German axis is also important for theories of 
international relations institutionalism; the durability of the EU’s institutions being sustained 
by support from the axis. It would take a collapse of the Franco-German axis, perhaps 
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brought on or exacerbated by a Brexit, to bring about the type of crisis necessary to change 
integration as understood by the theory of historic institutionalism. Theories of neo-
functionalism, transactionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism provide perhaps the most 
optimistic outlook, with economic interdependence making it too costly even for a state such 
as the UK to withdraw or, should it do so, leaving it in a position where it will continue to be 
bound economically to the rest of the EU. For comparative federalism, Britain’s increasingly 
distant political relationship with the EU could limit the potential for it to disrupt the 
emergence of a federal state. As Webber pointed out, with all of these theories we should 
not overlook the wider domestic politics of other EU member states, especially growing 
Euroscepticism in a range of states that mean the UK is not the only state with a strained 
political relationship with the rest of the EU. And the role of Germany is key, whether as part 
of a Franco-German axis or in its approach to managing the security and defence 
challenges the EU and European integration look set to face. Ignoring the possibility of a 
Brexit risks ignoring a development that would play an important, perhaps transformative, 
part in the EU’s development. 
A way has therefore to be found for the EU to give appropriate attention to the possibility of a 
Brexit. Focusing solely on the ‘British question’ would more than likely lead to 
disappointment on all sides. The attention would create expectations on the part of the 
British that concerns about Britain’s membership are the most important issue on the 
agenda. This is an expectation the rest of the EU would be unable to fulfil. For the rest of the 
EU, focusing on Britain is likely to cause resentment across the EU at giving into - or being 
more willing to discuss - British demands at the expense of other agendas. Neither would be 
in the interests of the EU or wider European unity, especially when Europe’s place in the 
world will face a growing number of challenges as the world enters a more multipolar era. 
 
